## Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident at Motts Lane level crossing, Witham, Essex

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

## **Key to Recommendation Status**

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.	
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.	


RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.



Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
1 24/01/2013 01/2014  Fatal accident at Motts Lane level crossing, Witham, Essex  Status: Implementation ongoing	The intention of this recommendation is to reduce the risk created by long waiting times by taking action at other locations where this situation may exist.  Network Rail should, as soon as possible, review all automatic level crossings (including AHB, ABCL, AOCL and MSL crossings) to identify locations where complex track and signalling layouts, nearby stations and/or railway operations may lead to the red road/pedestrian lights showing for an excessively long time. At each location that is identified, Network Rail should assess the risk from extended closure times, and take action to manage this risk as necessary (paragraph 116a).	ORR reports that Network Rail have implemented a project to identify all automatic level crossings that have excessive sequence times and, for those found to be excessive, the reasons for this. In each such case Network Rail proposes to implement an action plan to manage the risk. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been complemented.
2 24/01/2013 01/2014  Fatal accident at Motts Lane level crossing, Witham, Essex  Status: Implementation ongoing	The intention of this recommendation is to reduce the risk that local signalling practices may lead to unnecessarily long waiting times at level crossings.  Network Rail should determine, in the light of the risk that arose from the indiscriminate use of the non-stopping setting at Liverpool Street IECC, whether there are any other locations where local instructions/practices may be at risk of introducing unnecessarily long waiting times at automatic crossings, and take appropriate action to correct the situation (paragraph 116b).	ORR reports that Network Rail have implemented a project to identify all automatic level crossings that have excessive sequence times and, for those found to be excessive, the reasons for this. In each such case Network Rail proposes to implement an action plan to manage the risk. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been complemented.
3 24/01/2013 01/2014  Fatal accident at Motts Lane level crossing, Witham, Essex  Status: Implementation ongoing	The intention of this recommendation is to reduce the risk that may be created by the interaction of ARS with the controls for level crossings, by reviewing the principles which define the design of such systems.  Network Rail should review its processes for designing and implementing ARS where it interacts with level crossing controls, and amend or enhance them as necessary to produce assurance that the design will result in the crossing operating in accordance with relevant standards and guidance (paragraph 116c).	ORR reports that Network Rail will review its processes for designing and implementing ARS where it interacts with level crossing controls. Where the review does not provide assurance that following the process will result in the crossing operating in accordance with the relevant requirements and guidance, it will propose change.  ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.
4 24/01/2013 01/2014  Fatal accident at Motts Lane level crossing, Witham, Essex  Status: Implemented	The intention of this recommendation is to improve the control of risk by establishing appropriate maximum times that red lights should show for, and taking the red light times into account at regular reviews of the safety of level crossings.  Network Rail should establish, by carrying out research or otherwise, appropriate maximum time(s) for red lights to be designed to be shown at MSL crossings, and acceptable levels of variability for this time (taking into account factors such as the	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.

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Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status

## **Safety Recommendation**

(paragraph 116c).

consideration of the length of time that the red lights show

types of train, and stopping patterns), in view of the risk that users may become intolerant of extended waiting times. Taking account of the results of this work, it should modify its risk management processes for MSL crossings to include

Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)

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