

## Recommendation(s) Status: Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing, Berkshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>In-progress:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1            04/09/2011    28/2012</p> <p>Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing, Berkshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that signallers can see appropriate information on the VDU screen when considering whether to remove reminders from signals and points using controls on IECC workstation VDUs. These include reminders on signals that are used to protect an automatic crossing under local control.</p> <p>Network Rail should identify, and provide a time bound plan to eliminate, all IECC VDU controls which permit a signal or point reminder to be removed in situations where the signaller cannot see sufficient on-screen messages and indications to inform the decision whether to remove the reminder (paragraph 155).</p>	<p>ORR reports that Network Rail has carried out a risk assessment and identified a solution which should be applied on all existing IECC workstations where the residual life provides a positive business case. A risk assessment model is available to assist the Routes in carrying out this assessment. A single time bound plan for implementation has been developed and is being monitored by ORR. ORR have also reported that Network Rail has required that all project teams working on new schemes address the risk identified in recommendation 1.</p>
<p>2            04/09/2011    28/2012</p> <p>Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing, Berkshire</p> <p>Status: In-progress</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to provide an interface which reduces the likelihood of IECC signallers setting a route over an automatic half barrier level crossing under local control without advising the level crossing attendant and cautioning the train driver. The intent will be satisfied if a similar message is displayed in other crossing failure conditions and/or if the interface is provided within IECC software in a manner which provides a lower safety integrity level than required for some other signalling applications.</p> <p>In respect of automatic half barrier level crossings supervised from IECC installations, Network Rail should consider interfacing information about level crossing status with signal controls to reduce the risk of signallers permitting a train to pass over the crossing without applying the rules applicable to local control. Network Rail should include consideration of a warning or reminder which must be acknowledged on each occasion that a signaller attempts to set a route over a level crossing under local control. If found practical, Network Rail should modify standards and specifications to require this feature in future IECC upgrades and new installations (paragraph 158).</p>	<p>ORR reports that Network Rail has decided that for future installations of the Traffic Management System a function will be provided to prompt the signaller to provide confirmation before allowing route to be set over a level crossing in failed state/local mode. ORR are monitoring the way that this is to be implemented.</p>
<p>3            04/09/2011    28/2012</p> <p>Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing, Berkshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that, when automatic half barrier level crossings are under local control, IECC displays provide conspicuous warnings compatible with Network Rail's IECC control and indication specification.</p> <p>Network Rail should review the local control indications displayed in respect of automatic half barrier level crossings on the Thames Valley Signalling Centre (TVSC) VDUs to identify any inconsistencies with the associated Network Rail specification requirements. If any of these inconsistencies have the potential to have a significant adverse effect on safety,</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has carried out a review and has concluded that the issue is not seen as presenting any risk in the short term, as the meaning is understood. However, the displayed text specified in the standard has been included in the work scope for a project that will involve an extension of the area covered by the Thames Valley Signalling Centre. NR has also codified its design guidance for all AHB's in light of the Ufton incident.</p>

Network Rail should amend the indications displayed at TVSC and/or the Network Rail IECC control and indication specification so that appropriately positioned conspicuous indications are displayed on all IECC VDUs (paragraph 156).

4            04/09/2011    28/2012  
Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing,  
Berkshire  
Status: In-progress

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the planned arrangements for setting up, alteration and handing back of possessions, and any planned signalling input to associated activities, does not cause an excessive workload for any signaller.

ORR has reported that NR has outlined the actions to be taken in response to the recommendation.  
ORR is not content with duty-holder response, further engagement ongoing / proposed.

Network Rail should examine and implement ways in which the workload of signallers can be kept within reasonable levels during engineering possessions, particularly those involving multiple changes to possession limits. This work should aim to avoid, where practical, situations in which signallers must delay engineering work or train services in order to avoid excessive workload (paragraphs 155 and 157).

5            04/09/2011    28/2012  
Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing,  
Berkshire  
Status: In-progress

The intent of this recommendation is to assist incident investigation and competence management of signallers by recording, and facilitating playback of, all signallers' actions during their work at workstations included in future IECC projects.  
Network Rail should modify appropriate standards and specifications so that future IECC installations include a system to fully record signaller's actions. Information recorded should include:  
• reminder appliance override;  
• signaller's selection of VDU view; and  
• the view used when controls are operated using a VDU view.  
Where practical, the system should incorporate a playback feature (paragraph 158).

ORR reports that NR has assessed the options for logging IECC data. This assessment recommended the inclusion of full playback facilities in future systems. Network Rail has still to explain how it is to modify appropriate standards and specifications so that future IECC installations include a system to fully record signaller's actions.

6            04/09/2011    28/2012  
Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing,  
Berkshire  
Status: Implemented by alternative means

The intent of this recommendation is to provide consistent and appropriate instructions to level crossing attendants about the positioning of red lamps and flags used when level crossings are under local control.

Network Rail has reported to ORR that it has amended the training material for crossing attendants and the associated keypoint card, to clarify the way in which the requirements of the Rule Book should be applied.

Network Rail should review the existing requirements concerning the number of red flags or lights to be placed on each side of a level crossing under local control. Network Rail, if necessary in co-operation with the RSSB, should then take appropriate action to ensure that the correct, clear and consistent information is included in training, instructions and rules applicable to level crossing attendants (paragraph 158).

**Number/ Date/ Report No/  
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7            04/09/2011    28/2012

Near miss incident at Ufton AHB crossing,  
Berkshire

Status: Implemented

**Safety Recommendation**

The intent of this recommendation is to correct a misunderstanding among some engineering supervisors concerning the requirement for red lights or flags to be displayed at level crossings at all times when they are under local control unless the barriers are lowered.

Network Rail should re-brief staff that level crossing attendants' red lamps/ flags must never be removed when level crossings are under local control and the barriers are raised or the gates are open (paragraph 158).

**Summary of current status (based on latest report from  
the relevant safety authority or public body)**

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.