

Recommendation(s) Status: Passenger accident at Brentwood station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 28/01/2011 19/2011</p> <p>Passenger accident at Brentwood station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 1 is for Network Rail, in partnership with relevant train operating companies, to make improvements to the assessment of DOO train dispatch arrangements at unstaffed platforms. The assessment should consider the equipment provided and the way in which it is used. The involvement of both infrastructure owner and train operator is necessary in order to obtain the maximum benefit from such an exercise.</p> <p>Network Rail should arrange, execute and accurately record, in partnership with relevant train operating companies, periodic assessments of the DOO equipment provided at unstaffed platforms with particular reference to the quality of the interface between the equipment provided and the way in which it is used (paragraphs 135c, 136d, and 137b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that NR has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 28/01/2011 19/2011</p> <p>Passenger accident at Brentwood station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 2 is to reduce the likelihood of a train departing from a platform with a passenger in an unsafe position relative to the train.</p> <p>The Rail Safety and Standards Board should, in consultation with train operators, consider the inclusion of guidance in Rail Industry Standard RIS-3703-TOM that those responsible for train dispatch (including the drivers of DOO trains) should, so far as is reasonably practicable, observe the closing of the train's doors and be alert for any dangerous occurrence while this is taking place (paragraph 136a).</p>	<p>The Rail Safety and Standards Board has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 28/01/2011 19/2011</p> <p>Passenger accident at Brentwood station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 3 is for National Express East Anglia to make improvements to its train driver training and assessment processes to promote effective management of the risk associated with DOO train working, and in particular, the dispatch of DOO trains from unstaffed platforms.</p> <p>National Express East Anglia should complete a systematic review and updating of its train driving task analysis relating to the dispatch of Driver Only Operated (DOO) trains from unstaffed platforms to assure that hazards are identified and the risk properly addressed. The results of this review should be incorporated into the train driver training programme, train driver competence management system and ongoing safety briefing processes to facilitate the changes necessary to adequately address the risk from DOO train dispatch, particularly from unstaffed platforms (paragraphs 136b and 136d, 137a, 137c and 137d).</p>	<p>ORR reports that the train operator involved (now Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd) has completed the high level risk assessment for train dispatch, updated its Safety Manual document and updated its Competence Management System documentation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action</p>

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<p>4 28/01/2011 19/2011</p> <p>Passenger accident at Brentwood station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 4 is for National Express East Anglia to take steps to improve the availability of data from the on-train CCTV systems fitted to its trains.</p> <p>National Express East Anglia should take the necessary steps to ensure that the on-train CCTV systems (including forward and rear facing CCTV equipment) fitted to its trains achieve a high level of availability (paragraph 138a).</p>	<p>National Express East Anglia (now Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd) has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>5 28/01/2011 19/2011</p> <p>Passenger accident at Brentwood station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 5 is for National Express East Anglia to make improvements to its monitoring processes to ensure periodic reviews, such as risk assessment reviews, are undertaken at the specified frequencies.</p> <p>National Express East Anglia should review and update as necessary its monitoring systems so that where periodic safety reviews are required they are undertaken at the necessary frequencies (paragraph 138c).</p>	<p>ORR reports that the train operator involved (now Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd) has detailed in a Safety Management System document how it will review risk assessments and how it will check that these reviews are carried out at the required periodicity. However, it is not clear to the RAIB whether these are specific to train dispatch or applicable to all periodic reviews as intended in the recommendation.</p>