

Recommendation(s) Status: Investigation into safety of Automatic Open Crossing, Locally-monitored (AOCL) on Network Rail's infrastructure

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

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| Implemented: | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. |
| Implemented by alternative means: | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. |
| Implementation ongoing: | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. |
| In-progress: | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. |
| Non-implementation: | Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. |

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status | Safety Recommendation | Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB) |
|---|--|--|
| <p>1 02/02/2010 12/2011</p> <p>Investigation into safety of AOCLs on Network Rail's infrastructure</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>The intention of this recommendation is that Network Rail should upgrade the highest risk AOCLs by fitting barriers, or implementing other measures to deliver an equivalent or improved level of safety, such as by closing crossings.</p> <p>The RAIB envisages that when identifying those crossings to be upgraded, special consideration should be given to those 32 crossings with an enhanced likelihood of a road vehicle and train collision. However, it is anticipated that Network Rail's more detailed assessment of risk, taking into account factors such as the speed of trains, may identify different and/or additional crossings for upgrade.</p> <p>The RAIB is aware that Network Rail's development of retrofit half barriers should allow a cost effective upgrade, but if this development is not completed and proved in the near future, the upgrading of the highest risk AOCLs should still be implemented based on existing forms of level crossing protection.</p> <p>In addition, the RAIB is of the view that the implementation of a programme to upgrade AOCL crossings should not be delayed by the need to review and improve existing risk assessment management arrangements (as outlined in Recommendation 3).</p> <p>Network Rail should immediately implement a programme to upgrade the highest risk AOCLs. The crossings for upgrade should be selected by appropriately skilled personnel, on the basis of factors that include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> their past record of incidents and accidents; an assessment of risk and the safety benefit of the upgrade; and the human factors issues present at each. <p>Upgrades should consist of fitting barriers, or other measures delivering an equivalent or improved level of safety (paragraph 153).</p> | <p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>2 02/02/2010 12/2011</p> <p>Investigation into safety of AOCLs on Network Rail's infrastructure</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>In parallel with, but not delaying Recommendation 1 the intention of this recommendation is that Network Rail reviews the existing risk assessments of all AOCLs to identify whether all the relevant human and local factors have been identified and appropriate mitigations implemented. Where this is not the case, a prioritised programme of improvements should be implemented:</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |

Safety Recommendation

Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)

Network Rail should review its risk assessments at AOCLs to identify whether:

all the relevant human and local factors have been identified (consideration should be given to the human factors issues in appendix F); and

all appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented.

Where omissions are identified, these should be rectified by a prioritised programme of improvements (paragraph 168).

3 02/02/2010 12/2011
Investigation into safety of AOCLs on Network Rail's infrastructure
Status: Implemented

In parallel with, but not delaying Recommendation 1, the intention of this recommendation is to improve the risk assessment of level crossings by the correct identification of specific human factors issues and other local factors, and the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures:

Network Rail should review, and as necessary update, its processes, guidance, training and briefing of its staff, on how to identify and assess the specific human and local factors at level crossings, so that it can establish whether further mitigation measures should be implemented (paragraph 169).

ORR reports that Network Rail has reviewed and updated its processes, guidance and training to staff as part of its wider National Level Crossing Programme which has focused on identification, assessment and management of risk. It has also recruited 100 Level Crossing Managers (LVM's) who will be responsible for identifying, assessing and managing risk at level crossings. They will develop good knowledge of their zone of crossings and undertake risk assessments, asset inspections, faulting and limited maintenance. The training programme mandatory to LCMs includes detailed guidance on how to identify and assess the specific human and local factors at level crossings including distraction and impatience. The National Level Crossing Team will track the LCM's training progress using a training qualifications framework. The qualifications framework supports the mentoring framework a key element to the improved regime. The National Level Crossings team has identified that training is the first step in improved level crossing risk assessments but will really come into fruition when LCMs are competent and confident in their role. The training modules are available so any future staff undertaking risk assessments will also be trained in identifying human factors. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

4 02/02/2010 12/2011
Investigation into safety of AOCLs on Network Rail's infrastructure
Status: Implemented

The intention of this recommendation is to make sure that the development of digital red light enforcement equipment is not delayed unnecessarily and that it is installed at selected AOCLs with a high incidence of violations:

In collaboration with the police, Network Rail should, without unnecessary delay, complete the development of digital red light enforcement equipment and install it at selected AOCLs which have high levels of violations (paragraph 161).

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.