

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

1 28/11/2009 19/2010
Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset
Status: Implemented 

This recommendation is intended to reduce the risk which may be created by off track drainage overflowing.

Network Rail should instigate a process to:

I Identify all locations where unsatisfactory operation of off track drainage is a significant risk to railway safety. Identifying these locations should be assisted by use of information being collected as part of Network Rail's on-going drainage asset surveys, knowledge already required for adverse weather planning and data being obtained from on-going studies to identify locations where ground topography concentrates water flows.

I For all such locations establish a programme to:

o Determine for each location the site specific parameters which are sufficient to ensure satisfactory off track drainage performance. These parameters should include ditch sizes and the extent to which roots may remain in place. The parameters shall be verified by a drainage professional.

o Maintain off track drainage to comply with these parameters.

Network Rail has reported that in accordance with the recommendation, the location of drains is being recorded and a time bound plan is provided for implementing maintenance. The ORR has concluded that Network Rail is taking a broad approach to implement the intent of the recommendation as part of a wider plan to improve drainage management. ORR has also reported that it has two projects in 2013/14 to check the implementation of Network Rails improved process. The RAIB is concerned that there is no reference to establishing the size to which drains should be maintained and no mention of how roots should be dealt with. This implies a continuation of the existing practice which limits clearance to that material which is obviously debris and no guidance concerning tree roots. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. \$

2 28/11/2009 19/2010
Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset
Status: Implemented

The intention of this recommendation is to improve compliance with Network Rail's requirements for earthwork stewardship in South East Territory.

Network Rail should examine the extent of compliance with its requirements for the management of earthworks in Southeast Territory and put in place management processes to ensure full compliance.

These processes should cover:

I Briefing staff and, if necessary, clarifying standards, so that all earthwork evaluations take full account of all relevant historical records already held by Network Rail, and any other readily available records. (If necessary, Network Rail should modify its archive retrieval system to allow efficient recovery of these records.)

I Improving compliance with the NR/L2/CIV/086 requirement that all earthworks in 'poor' condition are subject to re-evaluation whenever examinations show their condition has worsened.

I Providing a comprehensive extreme weather plan (including actions unrelated to flood and scour) in accordance with TRK/1010 for the Wessex Route and for any other areas where

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

extreme weather plans are not fully compliant with TRK/1010.
Current practice should be included in these plans as soon as
practical.

3 28/11/2009 19/2010
Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset
Status: Implemented

This recommendation is intended to prevent errors from
previous earthwork examinations being carried forward into later
examination reports.

Network Rail should modify the earthwork re-examination
process so that earthwork examiners must positively confirm the
accuracy of all examination data including any data which
remains unchanged from the previous examination.

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response
to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become
aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

4 28/11/2009 19/2010
Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset
Status: Implemented

This recommendation seeks to ensure sufficient professional
drainage expertise is available in SET without compromising
other necessary activities.

Network Rail should determine, and subsequently keep under
review, both the actual workload of the E&DT and whether
existing resources are sufficient. If not sufficient, Network Rail
should provide additional resources to suit the workload.

Network Rail has reported that the resources in their Earthworks
and Drainage teams has been recently reviewed and
strengthened.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become
aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

5 28/11/2009 19/2010
Derailment near Gillingham tunnel, Dorset
Status: Implemented

This recommendation is intended to improve the accuracy of
earthwork examination reports.

Network Rail should modify its earthwork standards to require
that the earthwork examination process includes checking that
the drainage observations included in the examination report are
consistent with any drain location and drain performance
information known to maintenance teams.

Network Rail report that the requirement for the examiner to be
aware of the Maintenance Teams drainage information will be
briefed to the examination controller and others involved in these
processes.