

Recommendation(s) Status: (Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria)

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
<p>1 13/11/2007 19/2009</p> <p>Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation</p>	<p>The Network Rail should propose a change to the Rule Book, in accordance with the Group Standards code, so that all members of a work group have the responsibility to ensure that they receive a full briefing prior to signing the COSS form.</p>	<p>Network Rail has carried out a review in response to this recommendation. Network Rail propose no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 13/11/2007 19/2009</p> <p>Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>In order to reduce the risk to track workers, Network Rail should review their programme for provision of automatic warning systems for red zone track inspections and if practicable should implement a programme to accelerate the introduction of appropriate systems for multi track areas.</p>	<p>ORR reports that Network Rail has, through the new Track Worker Safety Group, recently carried out a wide review of automatic warning systems and has accelerated its programme to introduce new innovative technology for the use of track workers. In particular, Network Rail has now extended the use of automatic warning systems to include Automatic Train Warning System equipment in certain identified locations and has accelerated the introduction of other automated warning systems such as Signal Controlled Working (SCW) for red zone work. Further technology is being considered and developed through a specific £10 million investment during CP5 [2014-2019]. Although the RAIB is disappointed with the time taken to fully address this recommendation but is encouraged that concrete steps are now proposed and awaits the outcome with interest.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action.</p>
<p>3 13/11/2007 19/2009</p> <p>Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should review the derogation that safety helmets need not be worn at all times during basic visual track inspection.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 13/11/2007 19/2009</p> <p>Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>In order to verify their effectiveness, Network Rail should monitor recently introduced processes that will show whether an individual's on-the-job performance routinely achieves the prescribed level with regard to safety. If necessary these processes should be enhanced.</p>	<p>ORR reports that this recommendation has been met primarily by enhancements to plan for the general inspection of site surveillance activity. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>5 13/11/2007 19/2009</p> <p>Track worker struck by train Grosvenor Bridge, London Victoria</p> <p>Status: Implemented by alternative means</p>	<p>In order to reduce the risk to track inspection staff, Network Rail should propose a change to the Rule Book and the COSS Handbook, in accordance with the Group Standards code, that amends the procedures for red zone working with lookout protection in a multi-track area to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clearly define an approaching train. Clarify the criteria for setting up a safe system of work, 	<p>RAIB notes that the Rule book handbook 7 now mandates criteria for deciding what is an approaching train. ORR also reports that changes to Network Rail Standards addressed the intent of the recommendation.</p>

including the circumstances that require pre-planning.

Consideration should include:

- a) the practical capabilities of lookouts;
- b) the possibilities for human error and its consequences;
- c) the ability to identify the track a particular train is using;
- d) the likelihood of multiple train movements;
- e) the complexity of track layout;
- f) the nature of the work being undertaken; and
- g) the size and disposition of the work group for continued observation by the lookout

6 13/11/2007 19/2009
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Bridge, London Victoria
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In advance of any change to the Rule Book and COSS Handbook under Recommendation 5 and to provide clear and unambiguous safety instructions and/or guidance, Network Rail should either eliminate the current practices used in relation to staff not moving to a position of safety but remaining in a location where they do not believe they are in danger from a train moving towards their site of work, or should introduce formally risk assessed alternatives for setting up a safe system of work in a multi-track area. The risk assessment should consider the topics listed in Recommendation 5.

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. \$w

Inspector's comment: This recommendation, which is all about track workers not using an adjacent line as a place of safety, is being proposed for closure on the basis of better decision-making by site safety people, especially the SWL: 'Since 2013 the COSS non-technical skills development day was rolled out to the majority of those that hold the COSS competence and is now part of the SWL training programme. This has provided those responsible for setting up the safe system of work on site with skills to enable them to make better safety decisions. The introduction of close calls has encouraged the reporting of potential incidents, rule book breaches and non-compliances, which are then actioned locally by the Responsible Manager. The use of Safety Conversations has enabled those responsible for undertaking site surveillance and inspections to better challenge poor safety behaviours.' Therefore, the basis for advocating closure is that the better quality of the personnel who devise and implement SSOWs means it is less likely they will choose an inappropriate place of safety. The jury is out on SWL. It seems premature to be closing it, particularly as SWL is not being implemented as originally envisaged, but, on the other hand, this recommendation has been open for 7½ years!

7 13/11/2007 19/2009
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Network Rail should validate the process and systems used to provide safety information for the COSS pack to show that its output is correct and complete.

ORR report that this recommendation has been addressed by an update of the safe system of work planning system. In addition a new control of work system is being developed. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to
RAIB)**

8 13/11/2007 19/2009
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Network Rail should identify and correct the apparent inconsistencies within the Sectional Appendix relating to maximum permitted train speeds on the approaches to Victoria station.

ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

9 13/11/2007 19/2009
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In order to ensure that staff allow an appropriate time to reach a position of safety, Network Rail should arrange to rebrief appropriate staff working on the railway so that they are reminded of the risks posed by areas of limited clearance such as the raised bridge parapets on the lines over the Grosvenor Road Bridge.

Network Rail has identified that the non fitment of limited clearance plates was unique to this bridge. It considers that the existing arrangements are adequate.
ORR is considering whether to close the recommendation.