

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>EWS should include napping within its fatigue management system and implement it as a fatigue counter-measure if the assessed risk of fatigue indicates that it is necessary (paragraph 195).</p>	<p>EWS has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. In addition Freightliner and DRs have reviewed their arrangements for the management of fatigue. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>If the assessed risk of fatigue requires napping as a fatigue counter-measure, EWS should provide facilities so that naps may be taken at locations where drivers take breaks and build sufficient time into rosters for taking naps and recovery afterwards (paragraph 196).</p>	<p>EWS has taken actions in response to this recommendation. In addition Freightliner and DRS have reviewed their arrangements for the management of fatigue. ORR has closed the recommendation</p>
<p>3 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The RSSB should initiate research to investigate whether a technique to deliberately shorten a night's sleep when changing from day shift to night shift and following this by sleep in the afternoon could be a viable means of reducing the risk of fatigue during the subsequent nightshift (paragraph 197).</p>	<p>RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The RSSB should investigate and if reasonably practicable instigate a change to Railway Group Standard GO/RT3251 so that screening for sleep disorders is required as part of the system of regular medical surveillance applied to train drivers and following incidents/accidents where fatigue has been identified as a possible causal or contributory factor (paragraph 198).</p>	<p>RSSB are to withdraw Railway Group Standard GO/RT 3251 as part of the agreement with Industry to reduce the number of sub standards. The board has proposed alternative arrangements to address the recommendation, the RAIB awaits the view of HMRI alternative proposal. The RAIB is satisfied with progress to date. Plus a suitable note in the annual report.</p>
<p>5 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>EWS should produce simple, targeted guidance for train drivers that provides clear advice on how they should conduct their lifestyles outside work so that levels of alertness are adequate when at work. The guidance should include the specific issue of how drivers should prepare for a first night shift (paragraph 200).</p>	<p>EWS has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. In addition Freightliner and DRS have reviewed their arrangements for the management of fatigue. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation.</p>
<p>6 09/02/2006 01/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>EWS should implement a system to rebrief at intervals the guidance issued as a result of Recommendation 5 above and include the families of drivers in the briefing if possible (paragraph 200).</p>	<p>EWS has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. In addition Freightliner and DRS have carried out a similar briefing. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation</p>

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7 09/02/2006 01/2007 Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray Status: Implemented	The RSSB should initiate research to investigate the practicalities of implementing personal responsibility statements and/or sleep contracts, and to investigate the benefits these could provide in reducing the risk of fatigue of persons working in the railway industry (paragraph 201).	RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
8 09/02/2006 01/2007 Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray Status: Implemented	EWS should implement a system where standard, simple questions are asked of drivers when being checked face to face for fitness for duty in order to identify cases of very long spells without sleep and alert managers to cases of particularly high levels of fatigue (paragraphs 202 to 203).	EWS has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
9 09/02/2006 01/2007 Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray Status: Non-implementation	Network Rail should extend the right hand switch rail of trap points 52A to direct a derailed train clear of the adjacent line (paragraphs 204 to 207).	Freightliner Heavy haul advise that a Lifestyle brief was prepared in 2003 but are unable to say how many times it has been re-briefed since then. Freightliner Heavy Haul is seeking information within the company on whether advice has been given re coping with the first night shift. Freightliner Heavy Haul do not have a napping policy and are not considering one as they believe it unnecessary as they design rosters so to render naps as unnecessary. COIN 03/09/2008 Ongoing DRS advises that it currently includes elements of fatigue monitoring as part of its formal competency management process for drivers, trainmen and shunters. DRS is considering the use and appropriateness of further monitoring as part of the CMS review which is currently taking place. COIN 06/10/2008 Ongoing
10 09/02/2006 01/2007 Derailment of a freight train at Brentingby Junction nr Melton Mowbray Status: Non-implementation	Recommendation arising from observations: Network Rail should reposition the SPT fitted to signal 53 so that it is located before the signal close to where drivers are required to stop if the signal is at danger at the position required by their companies' PDP (paragraph 209).	Rejected and closed: NR has evaluated the benefits and the costs and has rejected the recommendation. ORR has accepted this response and regard the recommendation as closed on 28/10/2008.