

DHC-1 Chipmunk 22, G-BBWN, 25 February 1996

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Aircraft Type and Registration:DHC-1 Chipmunk 22, G-BBWN

No & Type of Engines:1 De Havilland Gipsy Major 10 Mk 2 piston engine

Year of Manufacture:1952

Date & Time (UTC):25 February 1996 at 1630 hrs

Location:Near Netherthorpe Airfield, Nottinghamshire

Type of Flight:Private

Persons on Board:Crew - 1 Passengers - 1

Injuries:Crew - Minor Passengers - Minor

Nature of Damage:Aircraft Destroyed

Commander's Licence:Private Pilot's Licence with IMC Rating

Commander's Age:62 years

Commander's Flying Experience:1,159 hours (of which 847 were on type)

Last 90 days - 10 hours

Last 28 days - 3 hours

Information Source:Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot

The pilot reported that the aircraft was refuelled to approximately full tanks before taking-off for a flight from Netherthorpe to North Coates (approximately 50 nm), followed by a return flight to Netherthorpe. Both legs were uneventful, although carburettor warm air was used in the cruise on both occasions. The aircraft was then left in the open for approximately 45 minutes, after which the pilot decided to carry out a further flight. The oil level was checked and confirmed to be adequate and the engine started without requiring priming. Normal taxiing and pre-take-off checks were carried out with the carburettor air selected to warm until the aircraft turned onto the runway. The take off was entirely normal, the pilot recalling seeing 2,100 RPM indicated during the ground roll. During the climb-out, however, the engine suddenly misfired for 2-3 seconds before becoming silent. There was no response to throttle pumping. The pilot attempted to glide to the only suitable firm ground within range but was unable to position the aircraft adequately. This left him with no option but to "bellyflop" the aircraft in a three-point attitude onto a hedge. Unfortunately, the hedge contained a low stonewall which effectively destroyed the aircraft, the fuselage coming to rest on its

left hand side in an almost inverted position, although with only minor damage to the cockpit and engine areas.

A video recording of the whole flight was reviewed. This showed a trail of smoke coming from the aircraft at about the time it apparently ceased to climb. Observers confirmed that this trail appeared at about the time misfiring was heard.

The aircraft wreckage was examined and no defect was found in any part of the fuel-system. Some traces of water were found in the pipework and the main filter bowl, although these are thought to have resulted from snow (which fell after the accident) entering the outer end of the right fuel tank, which was seriously disrupted in the accident and became the highest point on the wreckage. (It is also thought that the local fire brigade, who were on site soon after the accident, projected some water into the exposed end of the tank).

The engine was removed under AAIB supervision from the airframe, no defects being identified during this process. It was transported to an engine overhaul agency approved for work on this engine type. The engine was then further examined in the presence of AAIB and prepared for running on a test-bed. During preparation, more water was found in the sediment bowls alongside both fuel pumps. It was noted that these were at the lowest point of the fuel-system as the aircraft came to rest and the wreckage was stored in this attitude for a lengthy period after the accident (as was the engine after its removal and during transit). Once the water had been removed from the fuel system, a full engine test schedule run was carried out using a test club to absorb power. The engine performed correctly throughout the RPM range.

An analysis of the met office aftercast for the area of the accident at approximately the time of the event showed that the temperature and humidity conditions were conducive to icing at all engine power settings. Other pilots flying at the time informed the pilot of G-BBWN subsequently that they believed they had been suffering some degree of carburettor icing. Although other aircraft refuelled from the same supply as the Chipmunk both before and after it refuelled, none suffered fuel related problems. The trail of smoke reported by observers and evident on the video was consistent with over rich operation before complete power loss.

The carburettor warm air system on Chipmunks operates in conjunction with the engine cooling by admitting air through the port side of the forward face of the engine cowling and allowing it to pass along that side of the cylinders. The ducting prevents it from exiting on the port side but permits it to pass around the cylinders so that it can exit only on the starboard side at the rear of the cowling. With the carburettor air control selected to the cold position, air is drawn through a scoop directly from the outside airflow, whilst when warm air is selected, air is drawn from a point high up in the starboard side of the cowling, this being a region of air which has already flowed over the cylinders.

The majority of light training aircraft in current use have a carburettor heat system which draws air through a duct fitting closely around the exhaust pipe system. This is known to produce a greater temperature rise than that in the Chipmunk arrangement. The largest user of Chipmunks, the Royal Air Force, used this aircraft type for over 40 years. During most of this period their aircraft had the carburettor warm air selector wired permanently in the WARM position. Their aircraft normally operated from large airfields where available runway length was not a limiting factor in the operation. Netherthorpe, in contrast, is understood to have the shortest licensed runway in the United Kingdom.