

# Airbus A310-304, D-APON, 21 April 1996

**AAIB Bulletin No: 6/96 Ref: EW/C96/4/8 Category: 1.1**

**Aircraft Type and Registration:**Airbus A310-304, D-APON

**No & Type of Engines:**2 CF 6-80C2A2 turbofan engines

**Year of Manufacture:**1988

**Date & Time (UTC):**21 April 1996 at 1746 hrs

**Location:**Stand 51, London Gatwick Airport

**Type of Flight:**Public Transport

**Persons on Board:**Crew - 9 Passengers - 40

**Injuries:**Crew - None Passengers - None

**Nature of Damage:**Extensive damage to No. 1 engine fan, minor damage to intake lip

**Commander's Licence:**Airline Transport Pilot's Licence

**Commander's Age:**58 years

**Commander's Flying Experience:**22,000 hours (of which 4,000 hours were on type)

Last 90 days - 180 hours

Last 28 days - 50 hours

**Information Source:**AAIB Field Investigation

## **History of the flight**

The aircraft, operating as RA229, left Frankfurt at 1610 hrs and landed at London Gatwick at 1741 hrs; the commander had called the handling agents at Gatwick approximately 30 minutes prior to landing advising them of his arrival time. After a normal landing on Runway 08R, the crew were cleared, via taxiways 6 and 4, to Stand 51. At the time it was daylight and the weather was good. As the commander approached Stand 51, he noticed that there was a Ground Power Unit (GPU) positioned on Stand 51L but considered that it would be clear of his aircraft. He also noted that there were no ground personnel awaiting D-APON and that the Azimuth Guidance for Nose-in Stands (AGNIS) and Parallax Aircraft Parking Aid (PAPA) lighting systems were on. The commander established the aircraft on the centre-line and taxied slowly forward to the indicated final position. With an estimated 3 feet to go, he felt an impact and stopped the aircraft immediately; there were no unusual engine indications but the commander realised that D-APON had collided

with something and secured both engines. Almost immediately, he was aware of personnel converging on the aircraft and he did not therefore advise ATC of the collision. On the jetty, the aircraft dispatcher had positioned to move the jetty onto the aircraft as it arrived on stand but he noticed the GPU and considered it a potential obstruction. He left the jetty and went down onto the ramp but was unable to attract the crew's attention before the collision.

### **Aircraft and GPU damage**

The impact damage comprised a short vertical crease in the lower lip of the intake, together with slight bruising and paint smearing of the lower outboard sector of the intake lip. In addition, a pair of rubber wheel chocks which had been left on top of the ground power unit fell into engine intake, one of these entering the rotating fan. The chock, which was too large to pass through the fan blades, was instead knocked successively around the periphery of the fan intake face causing extensive damage to the acoustic lining of the intake duct immediately in front of the fan, whilst being rendered down into progressively smaller pieces by the successive blade strikes. These smaller pieces of debris from the chocks, together with pieces of damaged acoustic lining, were then ingested through the fan and ejected from the bypass duct. So far as could be judged from an external inspection, damage to the engine was confined mainly to the outer periphery of the fan, with no damage being apparent to either the fan bypass duct or to the core-engine.

Impact marks were found on the GPU in question which showed that the engine intake lip had struck the rear part of the unit on the left side, approximately as shown in Figure 1. The positioning of the ground power unit on the stand was consistent with expected position for such a unit when connected to an F28 aircraft, the previous aircraft on stand 51 (the dotted aircraft outline shown positioned on stand 51 Left in Figure 1). The normal stop position for A310 aircraft on Stand 51 is also shown as a dotted outline in Figure 1.

### **Stand security**

Stand 51 on Pier 4 is a Multiple Aircraft Ramp System (MARS) stand which, in addition to a main central parking position, has two supplementary parking positions designated 51L and 51R. This enables one large or two small aircraft to use the stand. There are AGNIS lights on all three positions. All AGNIS lights at the airport are on permanently and controlled centrally; there are no facilities on the stands for switching the lights on or off.

At 1719 hrs, a F28 aircraft had departed from Stand 51L. The handling staff responsible for the despatch of this aircraft then noted that some trailers of bulk baggage and freight had been delivered to the stand and decided that a B737 type aircraft would soon be arriving on Stand 51L; they therefore decided that the ground equipment on the stand, a GPU with a set of aircraft chocks on top of it could be left in position rather than being moved to a designated equipment parking area. The handling agents, who were responsible for both the outgoing F28 and the inbound A310, have a 'Ground Operations Manual' which details the procedures by which their personnel must work. Section G2, page 2 states the following: "Vehicles and equipment should not be left on stands after the departure of aircraft, except in the authorised equipment parking areas".

Following the commander's call to the handling agent to warn of his arrival, an Aircraft Load Supervisor (ALS) and 7 other staff were allocated to meet D-APON on stand. However, as he was allocating tasks to his personnel, the ALS became aware that he did not have anyone in his group qualified to operate some of the essential equipment. This deficiency and associated time to get the qualified personnel meant that the group did not arrive on the stand until after the aircraft's arrival.

This therefore meant that the ALS was unable to comply with the following instruction in the 'Ground Operations Manual': "Prior to the aircraft arrival on stand, the person in charge of the arrival must ensure the stand is free of obstructions and all equipment is clear of the aircraft's path."

### **AGNIS operating instructions and meanings**

During the investigation, the procedures for the control of AGNIS lights were examined at both Heathrow and Gatwick, both BAA airports. This revealed a fundamental difference in that the AGNIS lights are permanently on at Gatwick whereas at Heathrow the ground staff have specific instructions only to switch them on when they have checked that the appropriate stand is clear of any obstruction; furthermore the Heathrow equipment is on timing switches and will turn off after 40 minutes.

AERAD and JEPPESON publications were also reviewed and neither revealed any information about the meaning of the illuminated lights with relevance to stand clearance. However, the UKAIP includes the following entry for Gatwick 'Visual Ground Aids':

"All stands with the exception of stands 1 and 125 and other specified areas are designed for nose-in/push back operations and are provided with AGNIS stand entry guidance system. MARS stands 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, and 65 are provided with permanently illuminated additional AGNIS units for aircraft alignment on the MARS centre-lines left and right of the main centre-line. Arriving pilots should note that the adjacent stand centre-lines have the AGNIS illuminated. Cross reference of the taxiway stand numerals against the stand designator on the face of the pier is recommended to avoid any confusion."

This entry emphasises the need for caution to ensure that the crew have identified the correct stand rather than relating to obstructions; it includes the phrase "permanently illuminated" but could indicate that only the left and right positions were permanently illuminated.

